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Abstract
We investigate the stability of International Environmen-
tal Agreements. The analysis of Chwe is extended by
investigating the question how to find farsightedly stable
coalitions. The myopic stability concept of d'Aspremont,
Jacquemin, Gabszeweiz, and Weymark and the farsighted
stability concept of Chwe are compared. Farsighted stabil-
ity, direct and indirect domination are discussed. Consider-
ing of the direct domination, we check for the single-step
stability by comparing the profits of every coalition mem-
ber after one-step deviation has occurred, while considering
the indirect domination (farsightedness) we check for the
multistep stability by comparing the profits of every coali-
tion member after a series of deviations have come to an
end. On the contrary, myopic stability assumes that play-
ers look only one step ahead. The improvement of farsight-
edly and myopically stable coalitions to the environment
quality and welfare are compared. Only the farsightedly
stable coalition (𝑈𝑆𝐴,𝐿𝐴𝑀,𝑆𝐸𝐴,𝐶𝐻𝐼,𝑁𝐴𝐹 , 𝑆𝑆𝐴)
improves the welfare and abatement by 20% and 79%
in comparison to all three myopically stable coalitions
together. Algorithms are developed, which can find all far-
sightedly stable coalitions structures.
Considerations for Management
Taking into account findings, management considerations
may include:
• Myopically stable coalitions are typically subsets of far-
sightedly stable coalitions.
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• Farsightedly stable coalitions are the largest stable coali-
tions without side payments, and bring the biggest
improvement in environmental quality and welfare.
• We predict the formation of coalitions that are bigger
than myopically stable but smaller than farsightedly sta-
ble coalitions. This conclusion is valid under the assump-
tion that transfers are not allowed.
K E Y W O R D S
coalition formation, farsighted stability, game theory, integrated assess-
ment modeling, myopic stability
1 INTRODUCTION
The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEA) has two conflicting views. One is
based on cooperative game theory and concludes that the grand coalition is stable by using the core
concept, assuming linear utility, and implementing transfers, as countries have different benefits and
cost functions from greenhouse gas emission abatement (Chander, 2007; Chander & Tulkens, 1997;
Eyckmans & Tulkens, 2003). The other view is rooted in the noncooperative game theory, which
became the dominant path in the literature (Barrett, 1994, 2003; Botteon & Carraro, 2001; Finus, van
Ierland, & Dellink, 2006; McGinty, 2007; Osmani & Tol, 2010; Rubio & Ulph, 2006).
The usual approach of noncooperative game theory to stable IEAs is based on the idea developed
for cartel stability (d'Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszeweiz, & Weymark, 1983) and requires so-called
internal and external stability. Internal stability means that no country has an incentive to leave a coali-
tion, while external stability means that no country has an incentive to join a coalition. This part of the
literature reaches the conclusion that the size of a stable coalition is typically small.
This paper focuses on a comparison between myopic and farsighted stability.
Farsighted stability developed further the notation of stable sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947). Stable sets are defined to be self-consistent. The notion is characterized by internal and external
stability. Internal stability guarantees that the solution set is free from inner contradictions, that is, any
two outcomes in the solution set cannot dominate each other, and external stability guarantees that
every outcome excluded from the solution set is accounted for, that is, it is dominated by some outcome
inside the solution. Harsanyi (1974) criticizes the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution also for its
failing to incorporate foresight. He introduced the concept of indirect dominance to capture foresight.
One outcome indirectly dominates another, if there exists a sequence of outcomes starting from the
dominated outcome and leading to the dominating one, and at each stage of the sequence the group
of players required to enact the inducement prefers the final outcome to its status quo. His criticism
inspired a series of works on abstract environments including among others those of Chwe (1994),
Mariotti (1997), and Xue (1998). Chwe (1994) introduces the notion of farsighted stability, which is
applied to the problem of IEAs by Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002), Eyckmans (2003), and Osmani
and Tol (2009). Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002) consider identical countries, while asymmetric
countries are taken into account in our model. Eyckmans (2003) studies only single farsightedly stable
coalitions, while we allow multiple farsightedly stable coalitions. Similar to Osmani and Tol (2009),
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a more systematic way of finding farsightedly stable coalitions is introduced. But different to Osmani
and Tol (2009), a more general approach is used, and the focus is on the comparison between myopic
and farsighted stability.
The welfare functions of 16 world regions are taken from the Climate Framework for Uncertainty,
Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) model Version 2.8 (Tol, 1999a,b, 2001, 2002c). The social wel-
fare functions are per-member partition functions in our game-theoretical framework.
The paper extends the analysis of Chwe (1994), on the issue of how to find farsightedly stable coali-
tions, and concentrates on comparison between farsighted and myopic stability.
Furthermore, in the spirit of the Consistent Set of Chwe (1994), we define Dynamic Farsighted
Coalition Structure Set (DFCS); if a coalition structure does not belong to DFCS, then it is indirectly
dominated by another coalition structure which belongs to DFCS. Being aware of cycles, we follow
Chwe and build a weak solution, in the sense that outcome belonging to DFCS are only possibly stable.
We refine further the farsighted stability concept to the preferred farsighted stability. The preferred
farsightedly stable coalition is a farsightedly stable coalition where the majority of country members
reach higher profits in comparison to any other farsightedly stable coalition.1 The main contribution
of the paper is a detailed discussion and comparison of myopic stability and farsighted stability.
We show that the myopically stable coalitions are often subcoalitions of farsightedly stable coali-
tions. Besides, farsightedly stable coalitions can be frequently the largest size stable coalition that game
theory, without side payments, can realize. We would like to clarify that these conclusions are valid
under the assumption that transfers are not considered. If one allows transfers like in papers of Weikard
and Dellink (2014) and Osmani (2015) the size of myopically stable coalitions can be large too; in paper
of Osmani (2015) a myopically stable coalition can include even 15 regions, when the grand coalition
has only 16 regions, while in the paper by Weikard and Dellink (2014) even the grand coalition can be
myopically stable.
Moreover, the farsightedly stable coalitions always create the biggest improvement in environmental
quality and welfare.
Similarly to preferred farsightedly stable coalitions, we introduce preferred myopically stable coali-
tions. All myopically stable coalitions are found, and multiple myopic coalitions are compared with
multiple farsighted ones.
The paper is organized as follows.2 In Section 2, the game-theoretic model for farsighted stability,
and direct and indirect domination are presented; a numerical example is also presented in order to
illustrate our concepts on farsighted stability. Section 3 introduces the DFCS, and discusses how to
find single and multiple farsightedly stable coalitions. In Section 4, cost-benefit functions from the
FUND model are introduced, and single farsightedly stable coalitions are found. In Section 5, the game-
theoretic model for myopic stability is presented, and the single myopically stable coalitions are found.
Section 6 discusses the preferred stable (farsighted or myopic) coalitions, and finds multiple preferred
stable coalitions. Section 7 introduces a detailed discussion on the comparison between myopic and
farsightedly stable coalitions. Section 8 provides the conclusions. Appendix A briefly introduces the
FUND model. In Appendix B, the algorithm on how to find multiple farsightedly stable coalitions, is
presented.3
2 THE GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL FOR FARSIGHTED
STABILITY
Similarly to Chwe (1994), a game Γ is defined as, Γ = (𝑁,𝑂, {≺𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁, {→𝐶}𝐶⊂𝑁,𝐶≠∅) where 𝑁 is
the set of players, O is the set of all coalition structures (which are also outcomes), 𝑁 ≠ ∅, 𝑂 ≠ ∅ ; {≺𝑖
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}𝑖∈𝑁 are the strong preference relation of the players defined on O; the preference relation is reflexive,
complete, and transitive. Before explaining the game further, let us define the coalition structure:
Definition 2.1. A coalition structure 𝑎 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2,…, 𝐶𝑚} is a partition of the set of players 𝑁 =
{1, 2,…, 𝑛} ∶ 𝐶𝑖 ∩ 𝐶𝑗 ≠ ∅ where
⋃
𝑖=1∶𝑚 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑁 .
A coalition structure fully describes how many coalitions are formed, how many members they have,
and also how many single players there are. The relation →𝐶1 introduces the actions that are available
to coalition 𝐶1; 𝑎1 →𝐶1 𝑎2 indicates that if coalition structure 𝑎1 is the status quo, coalition 𝐶1 can
make 𝑎2 the new status quo.
The game is “played” in the following way: when the game starts, there is a coalition structure (or
outcomes) status quo called 𝑎1. If the member of coalition 𝐶 decides to change the status quo from 𝑎1 to
𝑎2, or 𝑎1 →𝐶 𝑎2, then the new status quo becomes 𝑎2. This change of a status quo is called a coalition's
move or deviation, from 𝑎1 to 𝑎2. From this new status quo 𝑎2, another coalition might move, and so
on. If a status quo 𝑎3 is reached, and no player prefers to move, then 𝑎3 is called stable and the game
is over. The game does tell you if a move or deviation is possible, thus if a coalition structure 𝑎𝑚 is
possible or not.
The game is of a cooperative and noncooperative spirit. The selfishness of players shapes the aspects
of the noncooperative approach. The idea of farsightedness means that one should check for multistep
stability by comparing the preference of a coalition member after a series of deviations has come to
an end. The deviation is possible only if players display a cooperative attitude by forming a coalition
which they prefer.
As the game is defined, we will go on discussing direct and indirect domination.
If 𝑎1 ≺𝑖 𝑎2, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 , we write 𝑎1 ≺𝐶 𝑎2.
Definition 2.2. A coalition structure 𝑎1 is directly dominated by the coalition structure 𝑎2, or 𝑎1 < 𝑎2,
if there exists a 𝐶1 such that 𝑎1 →𝐶1 𝑎2 and 𝑎1 ≺𝐶 𝑎2.
The definition of indirect dominance taken from Harsanyi (1974) is introduced below:
Definition 2.3. A coalition structure 𝑎1 is indirectly dominated by the coalition structure 𝑎𝑚, or 𝑎1 ≪
𝑎𝑚, if there exists 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3,… , 𝑎𝑚 and 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3,… , 𝐶𝑚−1 such that 𝑎𝑖 →𝐶𝑖 𝑎𝑖+1, and 𝑎𝑖 ≺𝐶𝑖 𝑎𝑚,
where 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,… , 𝑚 − 1.
Henceforth, we will only focus on the “effective relation” that leads to indirect domination. This fits
in the spirit of farsighted stability as the farsighted players can see all possible deviations ahead, and
they are going to deviate only if they see further deviations ahead, which leads to an indirect dominance.
Note that if 𝑎1 < 𝑎2, then 𝑎1 ≪ 𝑎2.
Definition 2.4. A coalition structure 𝑎1 is a candidate for being farsighted stable only if it is not
indirectly dominated.
Here we stick with a weak solution like the original farsighted coalitional stability of Chwe (1994).
We simply consider any coalition, which is not indirectly dominated, as a candidate for being farsight-
edly stable.
At this point, the definition of cycles has to be given:
Definition 2.5. A cycle is a chain of coalition structures 𝑎1 →𝐶1 𝑎2 →𝐶2 𝑎3 … 𝑎𝑛−1 →𝐶𝑛−1 𝑎𝑛 →𝐶𝑛
𝑎1, where at least three coalition structures 𝑎𝑖 ∈ {𝑎1,… 𝑎𝑛} cannot be indirectly dominated.
In testing for farsightedly stable coalitions, cycles can be formed, and every coalition structure,
which is a part of a cycle, none which are indirectly dominated can be found.
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In order to compute candidates for the farsightedly stable coalitions, we assume (at this point) that
only one coalition is formed. There are three ways that a coalition can change when one coalition is
formed; a coalition gets smaller, gets bigger, or some members leave a coalition and some others join
it. When a coalition gets smaller then the internal indirect domination takes place; when a coalition
gets bigger then the external domination takes place; when some members leave a coalition, while
some other joins it then the subcoalition domination takes place. In order to find the farsightedly stable
coalitions, all types of indirect domination (internal, external, and subcoalition) are considered as a
combinatorial process. The definition of internal indirect domination is introduced below.
Definition 2.6. 𝑎1 is internally indirectly dominated by 𝑎𝑚, or 𝑎1 ≪ 𝑎𝑚, if there exists 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3,… , 𝑎𝑚
and 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3,… , 𝐶𝑚−1 where 𝐶1 ⊃ 𝐶2 ⊃ 𝐶3,… , 𝐶𝑚−2 ⊃ 𝐶𝑚−1 and 𝑎𝑖 →𝐶𝑖 𝑎𝑖+1, and 𝑎𝑗 ≺𝐶𝑗 𝑎𝑚
where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3,… , 𝑚 − 1.
If a coalition shrinks and its remaining members prefer the final coalition compared to the initial
one, an internal indirect domination becomes possible.
Definition 2.7. 𝑎1 is externally indirectly dominated by 𝑎𝑚, or 𝑎1 ≪ 𝑎𝑚, if there exists
𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3,… , 𝑎𝑚 and 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3,… , 𝐶𝑚−1 where 𝐶1 ⊂ 𝐶2 ⊂ 𝐶3,… , 𝐶𝑚−2 ⊂ 𝐶𝑚−1 and 𝑎𝑖 →𝐶𝑖 𝑎𝑖+1,
and 𝑎𝑗 ≺𝐶𝑗 𝑎𝑚 where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3,… , 𝑚 − 1.
If a coalition grows, and its remaining members prefer the final coalition compared to the initial one,
an external indirect domination becomes possible.
Definition 2.8. 𝑎1 is a subcoalitionally indirectly dominated by 𝑎𝑚, or 𝑎1 ≪ 𝑎𝑚, if there exists
𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3,… , 𝑎𝑚 and 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3,… , 𝐶𝑚−1 where 𝐶𝑙 ∩ 𝐶𝑙+1 ≠ ∅ where 𝑙 = 1, 2, 3,… , 𝑚 − 1 and
𝑎𝑖 →𝐶𝑖 𝑎𝑖+1, and 𝑎𝑗 ≺𝐶𝑗 𝑎𝑚 where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3,… , 𝑚 − 1.
The indirect subcoalition domination occurs when a number of old coalition members leave and a
number of new members join the initial coalition. The new coalition may be larger or smaller than
the original one. However, if a part of the old coalition members (a subcoalition), and the new coali-
tion members form a coalition, and prefer it compared to the initial coalition, a subcoalition indirect
domination becomes possible.4
Definition 2.9. If a coalition structure 𝑎1 is not externally ∧ internally ∧ subcoalitionally indirectly
dominated then coalition structure 𝑎1 is farsightedly stable or a part of cycle.
If we can transform the preference relations to a payoffs comparison, then it can be easily checked
by a combinatorial algorithm if a coalition is internally, externally, or subcoalitionally indirectly dom-
inated. In order to be able to compare the payoff of the coalition members, we need to introduce the
definition of partition function. Let us recall that 𝑁 = {1, ..., 𝑛} is the set of players, and that nonempty
subsets of 𝑁 are called coalitions. A partition (or coalition structure) 𝑎 is a set of disjoint coalitions,
𝑎 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, ..., 𝑃𝑘}, so that their union is 𝑁 ; the set of all partitions is  , and the set of partitions of a
coalition 𝐶 of 𝑁 (that is, all the partitions where coalition 𝐶 is part of them) is (𝐶).
Definition 2.10. The partition function is a mapping 𝑉 (𝐶,) ∶ (𝐶,) → ℜ where 𝐶 ∈  , which
assigns a value to each coalition in every partition.
Definition 2.11. The per-member partition function is a mapping 𝑣(𝑖)𝑖∈𝐶 (𝐶,) ∶ (𝐶,) → ℜ where
𝐶 ∈  , which assigns a payoff value 𝑣(𝑖)∗
𝑖∈𝐶 (𝐶,) to every member of each coalition in every partition.
The per-member partition function 𝑣(𝑖)𝑖∈𝐶 (𝐶,) gives a payoff value 𝑣(𝑖)∗𝑖∈𝐶 (𝐶,) (from now on, I
will write simply 𝑣(𝑖)∗
𝑖∈𝐶 for every coalition member). This helps us to transform the preference relation
to a comparison of coalition member payoffs.
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T A B L E 1 Our data for the year 2005
𝜶 𝜷 𝑬 𝒀
USA 0.01515466 2.19648488 1.647 10,399
CAN 0.01516751 0.09315600 0.124 807
WEU 0.01568000 3.15719404 0.762 12,575
JPK 0.01562780 −1.42089104 0.525 8528
ANZ 0.01510650 −0.05143806 0.079 446
EEU 0.01465218 0.10131831 0.177 407
FSU 0.01381774 1.27242378 0.811 629
MDE 0.01434659 0.04737632 0.424 614
CAM 0.01486421 0.06652486 0.115 388
LAM 0.01513700 0.26839935 0.223 1351
SAS 0.01436564 0.35566631 0.559 831
SEA 0.01484894 0.73159104 0.334 1094
CHI 0.01444354 4.35686225 1.431 2376
NAF 0.01459959 0.96627119 0.101 213
SSA 0.01459184 1.07375825 0.145 302
SIS 0.01434621 0.05549814 0.038 55
Notes: In the table, 𝛼 is the abatement cost parameter (unitless), 𝛽 is the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in dollars
per tonne of carbon), 𝐸 is the carbon dioxide emissions (in billion metric tonnes of carbon), and 𝑌 is the gross domestic product (in
billions US dollars). Source: FUND Version 2.8, Year 2005 (see http://www.fund-model.org for a detailed description of FUND and
links to published papers)









𝑖∈𝐶 are the per-member partition function values of a member 𝑖 of coalition 𝐶 with
coalition structures 𝑎𝑗 and 𝑎𝑚, respectively.
By comparing the payoffs of coalition members between different coalition structures, it can be
easily checked with a combinatorial algorithm if a coalition is internally, externally, or subcoalitionally
indirectly dominated.
2.1 Example
The full example of computation of single farsightedly stable climate coalitions is presented in Osmani
and Tol (2009), but here we present a small part of the numerical computations which test and find
the three-member coalitions that are not farsightedly stable, and illustrate numerically the concept of
internal, external, and subcoalition stability presented in Section 2. We use the per-member partition
function taken from the FUND model developed by Richard Tol (Tol, 1999a,b, 2001, 2002c). See
Section 4 for a detailed description of per -member partition function. Table 1 shows the parameters of
per-member partition function estimated by the FUND model, and 16 regions-countries (United States
of America USA, Canada CAN, Western Europe WEU, Japan and South Korea JPK, Australia and
New Zealand ANZ, Central and Eastern Europe EEU, the former Soviet Union FSU, the Middle East
MDE, Central America CAM, South America LAM, South Asia SAS, Southeast Asia SEA, China
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T A B L E 2 Three-member coalitions which are not externally farsightedly stable
𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑷 𝒓𝟑 𝑷 𝒓𝟓 𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑷 𝒓𝟑 𝑷 𝒓𝟓
USA 0.5336 0.5336 USA 0.5765 0.6916
LAM 0.0614 0.0614 SEA 0.177 0.2057
CHI 0.7613 0.7613 CHI 0.8048 0.817
NAF 0.322 0.322 NAF 0.3533 0.3976
SSA 0.3573 0.3573 SSA 0.3921 0.4173
T A B L E 3 Three-member coalitions which are not externally farsightedly stable
𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑷 𝒓𝟑 𝑷 𝒓𝟓 𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑷 𝒓𝟑 𝑷 𝒓𝟓
USA 0.457 0.6916 CAN 0.0198 0.0204
SEA 0.177 0.2057 EEU 0.0216 0.0217
CHI 0.7766 0.817 CAM 0.0142 0.0144
NAF 0.2203 0.3976 SAS 0.075 0.0753
SSA 0.2398 0.4173 SIS 0.0118 0.012
T A B L E 4 Three-member coalition which is not externally farsightedly stable






CHI, North Africa NAF, Sub-Saharan Africa SSA, and Small Island States SIS) that FUND takes
into account for the single year horizon 2005, which this example considers. The FUND model is
briefly described in Appendix A. The members of coalition behave cooperatively with each other and
maximize their joint welfare, and take the welfare of single countries as given; every single country
behaves noncooperatively by maximizing its own welfare and taking the welfare of coalition members
and the rest of single countries as given.
First, we note that all profitable climate coalitions are internally farsightedly stable (including the
three-member coalitions). Three-member coalitions which are not externally farsightedly stable are
presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4.
The first column of Table 2 presents the members of five-member final coalitions. The three coun-
tries of the coalition that are inspected are labeled in bold letters, while the members that join the initial
coalition are labeled in normal typeface. The second column of Table 2, 𝑃 𝑟3, displays the profits (in
billions of dollars) of the final coalition members when only the three-member coalition exists, while
the third column 𝑃 𝑟5 shows the profits of final coalition members when only the five-member coalition
exists. The profits of each country are higher when the five-member coalition is formed (𝑃 𝑟5) in com-
parison to the profits when the three-member coalition is formed (𝑃 𝑟3). As a result, the three-member
coalition (USA, LAM, CHI) is not externally farsightedly stable. Columns four, five, and six of Table
2 are similar to columns one, two, and three, and Tables 3 and 4 are similar to Table 2.
Tables 5 and 6 introduce the three-member coalitions which are not sub-coalition farsightedly stable.
In the first column, the country members which change their position (join or leave the initial coalition)
are placed. The three countries of a primary coalition which is inspected are labeled in bold letters,
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T A B L E 5 Three-member coalition which is not subcoalition farsightedly stable





T A B L E 6 Three-member coalition which is not subcoalition farsightedly stable






while the three members of the final coalition are marked with an asterisk on the top-right. It is clear
that countries in bold letters who have an asterisk on the top-right are simultaneous members of a
primary and final coalition. The second column of Table 2, 𝑃 𝑟3𝑜𝑙𝑑 , presents the profits of final coalition
members when only the primary three-member coalition is formed, while the third column of Table 2,
𝑃 𝑟3𝑛𝑒𝑤, introduces the profits when the final three-member coalition is built. The profits of members
of final three-member coalitions (with an asterisk on the top-right) are greater when the final three-
member coalition is formed 𝑃 𝑟3𝑛𝑒𝑤 compared to the primary three-member coalition 𝑃 𝑟3𝑜𝑙𝑑 . It follows
that the three-member coalition (JPK, NAF, SSA) is not subcoalition farsightedly stable. Finally, Table
6 is similar to Table 5.
3 COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS OF FINDING SINGLE
FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITION
In this section, we clarify the proceeding of computing a single farsighted stable coalition.
Let us first define the full-noncooperative behavior, which is necessary to define the profitable coali-
tion, crucial for calculation of farsightedly stable coalitions.
Definition 3.1. The situation in which each country maximizes its own profit, and the maximum
coalition size is unity, is referred to as the full-noncooperative structure (or 𝑎𝐹𝑁𝑆 ).
This is a standard Nash equilibrium. A coalition that performs better than the full-noncooperative
structure is a profitable coalition. Only profitable coalitions are tested, which is sufficient to find all
the single farsightedly stable coalitions (see Observation 3.3). The definition of a profitable coalition
is introduced below:
Definition 3.2. A coalition 𝐶 in coalition structure 𝑎𝑐 is profitable (or individual rational) if and only








𝑖∈𝐶 are per-member partition function values of a player 𝑖 of coalition𝐶 with coalition
structure 𝑎𝑐 and 𝑎𝐹𝑁𝑆 , respectively.
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Considering only profitable coalitions also reduces the computational effort required to find far-
sightedly stable coalitions. The profitability condition demands more than the superadditive property,
which requires that two different coalitions should generate more profits (or welfare) by joining forces
than by remaining separate; see Definition 4.1.
Observation 3.1. If there are no profitable coalitions, then the only farsightedly stable coalitions are
the coalitions with a unity size formed in the full-noncooperative structure.
Proof. That there are no profitable coalitions means that there is no direct or indirect domination
process that originates from the full-noncooperative structure (Nash equilibrium). This completes the
proof. ■
We present below an existence proof for farsightedly stable coalition:
Observation 3.2. There always exists a candidate for a farsightedly stable profitable coalition.
Proof. Let take a random profitable coalition 𝐶1. There are two possibilities:
(i) If the coalition 𝐶1 is not indirectly dominated, then 𝐶1 is a candidate for being farsightedly stable.
A candidate for being farsightedly stable means the coalition 𝐶1 is farsightedly stable or belongs
to a cycle.
(ii) If the coalition 𝐶1 is indirectly dominated, then there is a coalitions chain 𝐶1, 𝐶2,…, 𝐶𝑚 where
𝐶𝑚 indirectly dominates 𝐶1. If 𝐶𝑚 is not indirectly dominated, then 𝐶𝑚 is a candidate for being
farsightedly stable; if 𝐶𝑚 is indirectly dominated, then there exists a coalitions chain where the
last coalition (in the coalitions chain) dominates 𝐶𝑚. As coalitions chains that leads to indirect
dominations are finite, they will end to a certain coalition 𝐶𝑙, which is going to be a candidate for
being farsightedly stable. This completes the proof. ■
The Observations 3.1 and 3.2 provide a proof of existence of farsightedly stable coalitions; Observa-
tions also leave no doubt that there is a close connection between a profitability condition and farsighted
stability.5 As at the moment only single coalitions are being tested, instead of talking about coalition
structure, we are only discussing coalitions. Finding profitable farsightedly stable coalitions is compu-
tationally challenging, but a straightforward job. One finds all profitable coalitions and begins to test
one by one if they are externally, internally, or subcoalitionally indirectly dominated by other coali-
tions. The profitable coalitions, which are not indirectly dominated, are farsightedly stable or belong
to a cycle. But can we find the nonprofitable farsightedly stable coalitions, if there are any? It is crucial
to note that, in real-world problems with asymmetric countries, one expects to have far more nonprof-
itable coalitions than profitable ones (because of asymmetry). This implies that the question has an
important computational aspect.
In order to answer these questions, we need first to define the positive, negative, and neutral spillover
property.
Definition 3.3. If a game for any two coalitions 𝐶1 ⊂ 𝑁 and 𝐶2 ⊂ 𝑁 such that 𝐶1 ≠ 𝐶2 satisfy:
• ∀ 𝑘 ∉ 𝐶1 ∪ 𝐶2 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1∪𝐶2 > 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1 ∧ 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1∪𝐶2 > 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶2 , we say the game exhibits positive
spillover property
• ∀ 𝑘 ∉ 𝐶1 ∪ 𝐶2 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1∪𝐶2 < 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1 ∧ 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1∪𝐶2 < 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶2 , we say the game exhibits negative
spillover property
• ∀ 𝑘 ∉ 𝐶1 ∪ 𝐶2 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1∪𝐶2 = 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1 ∧ 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶1∪𝐶2 = 𝑣(𝑘)𝐶2 , we say the game exhibits neutral
spillover property.
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Clearly if the positive spillover property is not satisfied, then it does not mean the negative spillover
property is satisfied. Usually one can assume that some players satisfy the positive spillover property,
while some others the negative or neutral spillover property.
It is reasonable to take the full-noncooperative structure as a starting point; we find all profitable
coalitions, and test every profitable coalition whether it is farsightedly stable.
Our combinatorial proceeding realizes that all possible coalitions, which can dominate our initial
coalition (let say 𝐶𝑙), are considered. Clearly all possible coalitions, which can dominate our coalition
𝐶𝑙, can be divided into three categories (𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3):
• 𝐶1 ⊂ 𝐶𝑙, which are checked when internal indirect domination is examined
• 𝐶2 ⊃ 𝐶𝑙, which are tested when external indirect domination is investigated
• 𝐶3 ∩ 𝐶𝑙 ≠ ∅, which are inspected when sub-coalition indirect domination is considered.
As a consequence, we ascertain whether there exists a coalition which dominates our coalition 𝐶𝑛
6.
It is clear that this is a huge combinatorial effort.7
Now we are able to state a very useful observation which makes sure that we are able to find all
farsightedly stable coalitions (profitable or nonprofitable), even if we use as a starting point only prof-
itable coalitions. This is especially important from a computational point of view, as in games with
asymmetric players, there are far more nonprofitable coalitions than profitable ones.
Observation 3.3. A nonprofitable coalition 𝐶𝑚 is farsighted stable if and only if:
(i) the positive spillover or neutral spillover property is not satisfied
(ii) ∃ 𝐶1 ⊂ 𝐶𝑚, and 𝐶1 is profitable; ∃ 𝐶2 | 𝐶2 ∩ 𝐶𝑚 ≠ ∅ where 𝐶2 is profitable, and 𝐶2 is directly
or indirectly dominated by 𝐶𝑚, and 𝐶𝑚 is not directly or indirectly dominated by any coalition.
Proof. Proof, First Statement:
First direction:
If a nonprofitable coalition 𝐶𝑚 is farsightedly stable, then the positive and neutral spillover property
is not satisfied.
Suppose that there is a nonprofitable farsightedly stable coalition 𝐶𝑛, and the positive spillover prop-
erty is satisfied. As 𝐶𝑛 is not-profitable, then:
∃ 𝑎 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑙 ∈ 𝐶𝑛|𝑣(𝑙)𝐶𝑛∗ < 𝑣(𝑙)𝑎𝐹𝑁𝑆∗. (1)
Suppose that the player 𝑙 leaves the coalition 𝐶𝑛 and becomes a single player, then as the positive
spillover property is satisfied we have:
𝑣(𝑙)𝐶𝑛 > 𝑣(𝑙)𝑎𝐹𝑁𝑆 . (2)
Equation (2) contradicts equation (1), which proves (by contradiction) that if we have a farsightedly
stable nonprofitable coalition, then the positive spillover property is not satisfied.
Proof Second direction: The proof for the second direction (and neutral spillover property) is similar
to the above one, so we omit it.
Proof Second Statement:
First direction: If a nonprofitable coalition 𝐶𝑚 is farsightedly stable, then there is a profitable sub-
coalition 𝐶1 ⊂ 𝐶𝑚. Besides, there is 𝐶2 such as 𝐶2 ∩ 𝐶 ≠ ∅, 𝐶2, which is directly or indirectly domi-
nated by 𝐶𝑚, and moreover 𝐶𝑚 is not directly or indirectly dominated by any coalition.
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Part 1, First direction: Suppose that every subcoalition of any nonprofitable farsightedly stable (FS)
coalition 𝐶𝑚 has a country that receives a lower payoff than in the full-noncooperative behavior, then
the coalition 𝐶𝑚 is not FS. The coalition is not FS because it is possible to build an effective relation
to dissolve the coalition:
𝐶𝑚 → 𝐶𝑚−1,… , 𝐶1 → 𝑎𝐹𝑁𝑆 𝑎𝑠 ∀𝐶𝑙1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑚∃ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑙 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑣(𝑖)𝐶𝑙 > 𝑣(𝑖)𝑎𝐹𝑁𝑆 . (3)
The dissolving process is simple. Every country with a lower profit than in the full-noncooperative
structure leaves the coalition. As every subcoalition has one such country, the coalition is not FS. As
a consequence, coalition 𝐶1 must have a profitable subcoalition in order to have a chance of being FS,
which completes the first part of the proof.
Part 1, Second Direction: The proof of the second direction is similar to the first direction, so we
omit it.
Proof Part 2: Let us suppose that we have the chain of the effective relations, where 𝐶𝑚 is a non-
profitable farsightedly stable coalition:
𝑎𝐹𝑁𝑆 → 𝐶1,… , 𝐶𝑚−1 → 𝐶𝑚. (4)
We only focus on an “effective relation” that leads to indirect domination; as a consequence a nonprof-
itable coalition does not indirectly dominate the full noncooperative structure. This implies that in the
chain on the effective relation (4) ∃ 𝐶𝑖 which is profitable 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚. ■
Corollary 3.1. If the positive or neutral spillover property is satisfied for all players, then all farsight-
edly stable coalitions are profitable.
Proof. This follows immediately from Observation 3.3. ■
We should now mention an important assumption of our theoretical framework:
Assumption 1. A farsighted player does not free-ride as he knows that if he free-rides, the other players
are going to follow him, and all the players will therefore decrease their payoffs. As it is expected, a
farsighted player displays a type of “farsighted individual rationality.”
The free-riding of any player 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 is deterred based on the threat of the rest of the players of
coalition 𝐶 , who will free-ride if any player 𝑖 free-rides. The way that free-ride is deterred is not
unusual in game-theoretical modeling of coalition for environmental protection; it is very similar to
seminal paper of Chander and Tulkens (1995).
The experimental game theory supports this mode of behavior too; please see Fehr and Gaechter
(2000) and Ostrom (2000). It also fits well with the farsighted behavior, as it takes into account the
counter reaction of other players by showing, as it is expected, a type of “farsighted individual ratio-
nality.” One point has to be made here; a specific country can still leave the coalition in a public good
game, not only because of free-riding, but for example, in a nonprofitable coalition, when a country
can leave the coalition if its welfare is lower than in a fully noncooperative structure.
3.1 DDSCS and DFCS
We characterize the set of all Direct Dominating Stable Coalitions Set (DDSCS) as 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑑 .
Definition 3.4. A set  is a DDSCS if and only if:
• a coalition structure 𝐚 ∈  then a is not directly dominated
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• ∀ 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐛 ∉ ∃ 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐜 ∈  |𝐛 < 𝐜.
The definition first indicates that any coalition structure 𝑎 that belongs to DDSCS is not directly
dominated. Second, if a coalition structure b does not belong to DDSCS, there exists another coalition
structure 𝑐 ∈ 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑆, which dominates b directly.
In the spirit of Chwe (1994), we characterize the set of all farsightedly stable coalitions 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑠 as
the DFCS (or one can call it the Indirect Dominating Coalition Structure Set).
Definition 3.5. A set  is the DFCS if and only if:
• ∀ coalition structure 𝐚 ∈  a is farsightedly stable or belongs to a cycle
• ∀ 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐛 ∉  ∃ 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐜 ∈  ∣ 𝐛 ≪ 𝐜.
Similarly, the definition first indicates that any coalition structure a that belongs to the DFCS is
farsightedly stable, or belongs to a cycle. Second, if a coalition structure b does not belong to the
DFCS, it is not farsightedly stable. Furthermore, there exists another coalition structure 𝐜 ∈ 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑆,
which dominates b indirectly.8
As the indirect domination includes the direct domination, 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑠 ⊆ 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑑 , this indicates that the
DFCS is usually a subset of the DDSCS9; only rarely can they be identical.
3.2 Multiple farsighted stable coalitions
In this section, we discuss the formation of multiple farsighted stable coalitions.
When multiple coalitions are formed, one has to consider two different kinds of interaction among
coalitions, and between coalition and single players:
• one interaction happens between coalition and single players while number of coalition is fixed; in
this case, one can talk again for indirect internal, external, and subcoalition domination
• one interaction occurs among coalitions as well as between coalitions and single players while coali-
tion number can possibly change. We should check if this interaction results that coalition structure
𝑓2 dominates the initial coalition structure 𝑓1.
During the inspection of player exchange among coalitions as well as between coalitions and single
players, three essential (sub)interactions can happen:
i. A coalition 𝐶 of initial coalition structure 𝑎1 can be dissolved, its members can join other coali-
tions or become single members and form another coalition structure 𝑎2. It is clear that in the
final coalition structure 𝑎2, the members of coalition 𝐶 receive higher profits compared to the
profit in the initial coalition structure 𝑎1 where coalition 𝐶 takes part; this is a necessary con-
dition that the coalition structure 𝑎2 dominates the initial coalition structure 𝑎1, as we consider
only interactions that leads to direct or indirect domination (feasible interaction).
ii. A coalition 𝐶 can be formed that originates from initial coalition structure 𝑏1, its members
result from single players or coalitions which are actually formed. It is clear that in the final
coalition structure 𝑏2, the members of coalition 𝐶 receive higher profits compared to the profit
in the initial coalition structure 𝑏1 where coalition 𝐶 does not take part; this is a necessary con-
dition that the coalition structure 𝑏2 dominates the initial coalition structure 𝑏1, as we consider
only interactions that leads to direct or indirect domination.
iii. Coalitions in our coalitions structure 𝑑1 can exchange members and a new coalition structure
𝑑2 is formed. Please note that no new coalition is formed and no coalition is dissolved.
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First, we have to check if a coalition can be dissolved; if yes, a coalition 𝐶 can be dissolved, then
we have to find out if in the new coalition structure another coalition can be dissolved. We inspect all
the ways that a coalition 𝐶 can be dissolved. We stop when we find a coalition structure 𝑎𝑛, where no
coalition can be dissolved that results in another coalition structure 𝑎𝑛+1, which dominates the coalition
structure 𝑎𝑛.
There are many ways that one coalition 𝐶 can be dissolved. Let assume that the initial coalition
structure 𝑎1 has 𝑛 + 1 coalitions, and coalition 𝐶 has 𝑚 members; all the ways 𝑁𝑑𝑠 that the coalition 𝐶




















|𝐶| are all the ways that the 𝑚 members of coalition 𝐶 can join 𝑛,







𝑛! are the ways the (𝑛 + 1), 𝑛 … 1 subsets can be permuted.
Second, we have to check if a coalition 𝐶 can be formed. If a coalition 𝐶 can be formed, then we have
to find out if in the new coalition structure 𝑏2 another coalition can be formed that results in another
coalition structure 𝑏3, which dominates the coalition structure 𝑏2. We stop when we find a coalition
structure 𝑏𝑛, where no coalition can be formed that results in another coalition structure 𝑏𝑛+1, which
dominates the coalition structure 𝑏𝑛.
There are numerous ways that a coalition 𝐶 can be formed. Assume we have 𝑙 players all together,
𝑛 coalitions 𝐶1, 𝐶2 … 𝐶𝑛 with 𝑛1, 𝑛2 … 𝑛𝑛 members and 𝑠 single players, 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 +⋯ + 𝑛𝑛 + 𝑠 = 𝑙;









𝑙−2𝑛 is the number of coalitions (subsets) with 𝑖 elements from (𝑙 − 2𝑛) players (the number 2 is
placed because a coalition must have at least two members)
Finally, we have to check if the exchange members among coalitions can lead to another coalitions
structure 𝑑2 which dominates our initial coalition structure 𝑑1. We stop when the exchange members
among coalitions cannot lead to coalition structure 𝑑𝑛+1 which dominates our actual coalition structure
𝑑𝑛.






𝑡 , 𝑙1) dominating the initial coalition
structure 𝑎1 = (𝐶1, 𝐶2 …𝐶𝑡, 𝑙1) where 𝐶𝑖 ∩ 𝐶
′
𝑖
≠ ∅, the algorithms presented in Osmani (2014) are
able to find this (and then coalition structure 𝑎2 has to be tested, if there is another coalition structure
𝑎3, which dominates it). If there is no coalition structure which dominates our initial coalition structure
𝑎1 = (𝐶1, 𝐶2 …𝐶𝑡, 𝑙1), algorithm will give the answer that our initial coalition structure 𝑎1 cannot be
dominated, and consequently is farsightedly stable, or belongs to a cycle.
The algorithm is computationally very expensive, but it can be used for any arbitrary coalition struc-
ture. But similar to model of Zermelo (1913) for solving chess, we would like to stress that checking
for an arbitrary farsightedly stable coalition structure is computationally expensive but finite.
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4 COMPUTATION RESULTS FOR A SINGLE FARSIGHTED
STABLE COALITION
We use the per -member partition function (or simple profit function) of player 𝑖 (or country 𝑖) taken
from the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution (FUND) (Tol, 1999a,b,
2001, 2002c) which is briefly described in Appendix A:
𝑣(𝑖) = 𝐵𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖
𝑛∑
𝑗
𝑅𝑗𝐸𝑗 − 𝛼𝑖𝑅2𝑖 𝑌𝑖. (7)





𝛽 is the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions and 𝐸 unabated emissions. Table 1
shows the parameters of Equations (7), (8), and (9) as estimated by the FUND for the year 2005.
Specifically, the abatement cost function 𝐶𝑖 is represented as:
𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑅2𝑖 𝑌𝑖, (9)
where C denotes the abatement cost, R the relative emission reduction, Y the gross domestic product,
indexes i denote the regions and 𝛼 is the cost parameter.
The second derivative of 𝑑𝑣(𝑖)2∕𝑑𝑅2
𝑖
= −2𝛼𝑖 < 0 as 𝛼𝑖 > 0. It follows that the profit function of
every country 𝑖 is strictly concave, and as a consequence has a unique maximum. Hence, the noncoop-
erative optimal emission reduction is found from the first-order optimal condition:
𝑑𝑣(𝑖)∕𝑑𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑖 − 2𝛼𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑌𝑖 = 0 ⇒ 𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑖∕(2𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖). (10)
If a region i is in a coalition with a region j, the optimal emission reduction is given by
𝑑𝑣(𝑖 + 𝑗)∕𝑑𝑅𝑖 = 0 ⇒ 𝐸𝑖(𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗) − 2𝛼𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑌𝑖 = 0 ⇒ 𝑅𝑖 = (𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗)𝐸𝑖∕(2𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖). (11)
Thus, the price for entering a coalition is higher emission abatement at home. The return is that the
coalition partners also raise their abatement efforts.
Note that our welfare functions are orthogonal. This indicates that the changes in a country's emis-
sions do not affect the marginal benefits of other countries (that is, the independence assumption).
In our game, countries outside the coalition benefit from the reduction in emissions achieved by the
cooperating countries, but they cannot affect the benefits derived by the members of the coalition.
The superadditivity property is satisfied:
Definition 4.1. A game is superadditive if for any two coalitions, 𝐶1 ⊂ 𝑃16 and 𝐶2 ⊂ 𝑃16 ∶
𝑉 (𝐶1 ∪ 𝐶2) > 𝑉 (𝐶1) + 𝑉 (𝐶2) 𝐶1 ∩ 𝐶2 = ∅.
The superadditivity property means that if 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 are disjoint coalitions (here 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 can be
single players too), they should accomplish at least as much by joining forces as by remaining separate;
where 𝑃16 is the set of all single coalitions that 16 players can form. However, the game very frequently
(but not always) exhibits positive spillovers. The positive spillover property is usually satisfied except
for some coalitions that include members such as members Japan and South Korea or Australia and
New Zealand, which have negative marginal benefits (negative 𝛽 's) from pollution abatement.
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As we know, the per-member partition function allows us to compute the farsightedly stable coali-
tions. Finding all profitable coalitions needs a simple algorithm, although the computational efforts are
not small. One finds all coalitions and checks if all their members have higher profits in comparison to
the fully noncooperative structure.
The numerical results yield 15 profitable two-member coalitions. As there are many profitable coali-
tions, we have numbered them: for instance, 2 − 13, 2 means that a coalition has two countries, and
13 means that it is 13th on the list of two-member profitable coalitions. The profitable two-member
coalitions are:
(2 − 1) (USA, CHI) (2 − 2) (USA, NAF) (2 − 3) (USA, SSA)
(2 − 4) (CAN, SAS) (2 − 5) (ANZ, EEU) (2 − 6) (ANZ, CAM)
(2 − 7) (ANZ, SAS) (2 − 8) (ANZ, SIS) (2 − 9) (EEU, CAM)
(2 − 10) (EEU, SIS) (2 − 11) (FSU, LAM) (2 − 12) (CAM, SIS)
(2 − 13) (CHI, NAF) (2 − 14) (CHI, SSA) (2 − 15) (NAF, SSA)
The profitable three-member coalitions are introduced below (the superscript “fs” denotes farsight-
edly stable):
(3 − 1) (USA, LAM, CHI) (3 − 2) (USA, SEA, CHI)
(3 − 3) (USA, CHI, NAF)𝑓𝑠 (3 − 4) (USA, CHI, SSA)𝑓𝑠
(3 − 5) (USA, NAF, SSA) (3 − 6) (CAN, EEU, SAS)𝑓𝑠
(3 − 7) (CAN, FSU, LAM)𝑓𝑠 (3 − 8) (CAN, CAM, SAS)𝑓𝑠
(3 − 9) (CAN, CAM, SIS) (3 − 10) (CAN, SAS, SIS)𝑓𝑠
(3 − 11) (JPK, NAF, SSA) (3 − 12) (EEU, CAM, SAS)𝑓𝑠
(3 − 13) (EEU, CAM, SIS) (3 − 14) (EEU, SAS, SIS)𝑓𝑠
(3 − 15) (CAM, SAS, SIS)𝑓𝑠 (3 − 16) (CHI, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠
The profitable four-member coalitions are:
(4 − 1) (USA, LAM, SEA, CHI) (4 − 2) (USA, LAM, SEA, SSA)
(4 − 3) (USA, LAM, CHI, NAF)𝑓𝑠 (4 − 4) (USA, LAM, CHI, SSA)𝑓𝑠
(4 − 5) (USA, SEA, CHI, NAF)𝑓𝑠 (4 − 6) (USA, SEA, CHI, SSA)𝑓𝑠
(4 − 7) (USA, CHI, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠 (4 − 8) (CAN, EEU, CAM, SAS)𝑓𝑠
(4 − 9) (CAN, EEU, CAM, SIS) (4 − 10) (CAN, EEU, SAS, SIS)𝑓𝑠
(4 − 11) (CAN, CAM, SAS, SIS)𝑓𝑠 (4 − 12) (EEU, CAM, SAS, SIS)𝑓𝑠
(4 − 13) (LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF) (4 − 14) (LAM, SEA, CHI, SSA)
(4 − 15) (SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠
The profitable five-member coalitions are presented below:
(5 − 1) (USA, LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF)𝑓𝑠 (5 − 2) (USA, LAM, SEA, CHI, SSA)𝑓𝑠
(5 − 3) (USA, LAM, SEA, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠 (5 − 4) (USA, LAM, CHI, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠
(5 − 5) (USA, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠 (5 − 6) (CAN, JPK, LAM, SAS, SSA)
(5 − 7) (CAN, EEU, CAM, SAS, SIS)𝑓𝑠 (5 − 8) (LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠
There is only one six-member and only one seven-member profitable coalition:
(6 − 1) (USA, LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠
(7 − 1) (CAN, JPK, EEU, CAM, LAM, NAF, SIS)
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In total, there are 56 profitable coalitions. All profitable coalitions are internally farsightedly sta-
ble. By checking for external and subcoalition stability, we find that we have 28 farsightedly stable
coalitions: 1 six-member coalition, 7 five-member coalitions, 10 four-member coalitions, and 10 three-
member coalitions.
It is essential to note that the asymmetry of countries does not allow large profitable coalitions. When
coalition members maximize their joint welfare, the optimization process requires further emissions
reductions in those countries where it is cheaper to decrease emissions (where the marginal abatement
cost is low) until profit maximization is reached and the marginal abatement costs of the coalition mem-
bers are equal. As a result, those countries which initially have a low marginal abatement cost (if the
difference in marginal abatement cost among coalition members is also large before coalition forma-
tion) do probably not satisfy the profitability condition. On the other hand, the benefits from pollution
abatement vary for different countries. This implies that countries that benefit less from pollution abate-
ment do probably not satisfy the profitability condition. It follows that farsighted stability is a function
of the asymmetry of countries. Free-riding does not allow large myopically stable coalitions and the
asymmetry of countries does not allow large farsightedly stable coalitions under the assumption that
transfers are not allowed.
5 MYOPIC STABILITY
A game Γ is defined, as in Section 2; as already explained, a coalition structure fully describes how
many coalitions are formed, how many members they have, and also how many single players there
are. The relation →𝐶1 introduces the actions that are available to coalition 𝐶1; 𝑎1 →𝐶1 𝑎2 indicates that
if a coalition structure 𝑎1 is the status quo, coalition 𝐶1 can make 𝑎2 a new status quo. The relation
→𝐶1 makes the main difference in relation to the first game-theoretic approach of Section 2. In the
previous farsighted game, it was unrestricted, but at this point the relation →𝐶1 is very restricted, as it
allows only one-step single-player movement. So only one single country can leave or join a coalition
in a given coalition structure.
Definition 5.1. A coalition structure a with an 𝑆𝑝 set of coalitions in a and an 𝑆𝑠 set of all single
players in a, is myopically stable if and only if:
• every coalition 𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑝 is profitable
• internal myopic stability ∀ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶,∀𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝑝 𝑣(𝑖)∗𝑖∈𝐶 > 𝑣(𝑖)
∗
𝐶⧵{𝑖}




𝑗∈𝐶 or ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 | 𝑣(𝑖)∗𝐶∪{𝑗} < 𝑣(𝑖)∗𝑗∉𝐶
𝑣(𝑖)∗ 𝑣(𝑗)∗ are per-member partition function values of the countries 𝑖 and 𝑗.
We first demand that all myopically stable coalitions are profitable. The set of profitable coalitions
is 𝑆𝑝, and the number of profitable coalitions is |𝑆𝑝|.
A coalition structure a is internally myopically stable if for every coalition member who leaves
any coalition of a, the payoff (or profit, welfare) is decreased. A player 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑖, where 𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑝 has
𝑆𝑝 different ways to leave coalition 𝐶𝑖; in (𝑆𝑝 − 1) other coalitions, or as a single player. So there are
necessary |𝐶𝑖| ∗ |𝑆𝑝| inspections in order to find whether a certain coalition 𝐶𝑖 is internally myopically
stable. As there are 𝑆𝑝 profitable coalitions, there is a necessity for many inspections—see equation
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(12)—in order to test whether a certain coalition structure a with 𝑆𝑝 profitable coalitions and the 𝑆𝑠
single players is internally stable:
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
∑
𝑖=1∶|𝑆𝑝|
|𝐶𝑖|) ∗ |𝑆𝑝|. (12)
A coalition structure a is externally myopically stable if for every country that joins any coalition of a,
it decreases his profit or if a previous member of the coalition (which he joined) decreases its profit.10
There are |𝑁| − |𝐶𝑖| different players that can join a certain coalition 𝐶𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑝, where |𝑁| is the total
number of players, and |𝐶𝑖| is the number of players in 𝐶𝑖. As a consequence, we have to test |𝑁| − |𝐶𝑖|
times if any player of coalition 𝐶𝑖, or the new player that joins it are decreasing their profits. As there
are |𝑆𝑝| profitable coalitions, there is a necessity for as many inspections—see equation (13)—in order
to test whether a coalition structure a with |𝑆𝑝| profitable coalitions is externally stable:




where |𝐶𝑖| is the number of members in coalition𝐶𝑖, and |𝑆𝑝| is the total number of profitable coalitions
in coalition structure a.
It is evident that if a coalition structure has only one coalition, then one can speak of an internal
or external myopically stable coalition. The myopic stability considers only single-player movements.
Therefore, players are myopic as they can see only one movement ahead. A country that leaves the
coalition assumes that the rest of coalition members remains in the coalition, as well as nonmembers
of the coalition (the countries that do not belong to the coalition) remain nonmembers.
We present below a necessary condition on the existence of single myopically stable coalitions.
Observation 5.1. If there exist a chain of internally stable coalitions 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3,… , 𝐶𝑚 such that:
• 𝐶𝑖+1 is obtained from 𝐶𝑖 by adding one member to 𝐶𝑖 where 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2…𝑚,𝑚 + 1}
• every 𝐶𝑚+1, which is obtained from 𝐶𝑚 by adding one member, is not internally stable
then the coalition 𝐶𝑚 is myopically stable.
Proof. Note that claiming that every 𝐶𝑚+1 is not internally stable has a direct consequence, namely,
that 𝐶𝑚 is externally stable. As we have assumed that 𝐶𝑚 is internally stable, then it results that 𝐶𝑚 is
myopically stable. This completes the proof. ■
5.1 Finding single myopically stable coalitions
The computation results of single myopically stable coalitions are presented in this subsection.
The single myopically stable coalitions are myopically stable coalition structures that contain only
one coalition. First, all profitable coalitions are obtained. Finding all profitable coalitions needs a sim-
ple algorithm, although the computational efforts are not small. One finds all coalitions and inspects
whether all their members have higher profits in comparison to fully noncooperative structure. Then
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each coalition is tested if it is internally and externally myopically stable. Altogether, there are 11
myopically stable coalitions, which are presented below:
(CAN, SAS), (ANZ, EEU), (ANZ, CAM),
(ANZ, SAS), (ANZ, SIS), (FSU, LAM),
(USA, CHI, NAF), (JPK, NAF, SSA), (CHI, NAF, SSA),
(CAN, JPK, LAM, SAS, SSA),
(CAN, JPK, EEU, CAM, LAM, NAF, SIS).
6 PREFERRED STABLE COALITIONS
Indirect domination indicates how far coalition members can “see and change” in order to reach a
coalition, where the members of the final coalition obtain higher payoffs.11 However, with the help of
indirect domination, we cannot answer the following question:
Suppose that we have two different farsightedly stable coalitions, which have mutual members. The
following question could be posed: Which farsightedly (or myopically) stable coalition coalition is
most likely to be formed from the full -noncooperative structure? Clearly, the most common starting
point is the full-noncooperative structure.
We should use another criterion, namely, the preference criterion, which is defined below, in order
to further refine farsightedly stable coalitions.
The formal definition of preferred coalition is presented below.
Definition 6.1. A coalition 𝐶𝑚 is preferred over 𝐶𝑛, 𝐶𝑚 ⪰ 𝐶𝑛 if and only if:
for the majority of countries 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑚 ∩ 𝐶𝑛 𝑣𝐶𝑚 (𝑖)




∗ are per-member partition function values of the country 𝑖 as a member 𝐶𝑚 and 𝐶𝑛.
A coalition 𝐶𝑚 is preferred over 𝐶𝑛 if the majority of their mutual countries obtain higher profit in
𝐶𝑚.
The coalitions that are more easily formed will not only be farsightedly (or myopically) stable but
also preferred coalitions. Therefore, the preferred farsightedly (myopically) stable coalitions have a
higher probability of being formed.
6.1 Multiple preferred stable coalitions
In this section, the discussion is extended to the question of multiple stable coalitions. Due to the
computational complexity, we restrict ourself to two coalitions, namely:
(USA, LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA)fs
(CAN, EEU, CAM, SAS, SIS)fs
Note that the costs of the emission reduction of a region are independent of the abatement of other
regions and the benefits are linear. Consequently, in case of multiple coalitions, the changes in the
payoff for all regions, which are not members of two coalitions, are identical; considering these regions,
only the first part of payoff equation (7) is changed, namely, 𝛽𝑖
∑𝑛
𝑗 𝑅𝑗𝐸𝑗 , which is identical for each of
them. It follows that our two coalitions are farsightedly stable if there is no indirect domination, which
is caused by switching members between two coalitions. This has been numerically verified. Thus, we
conclude that our two coalitions can coexist and are farsightedly stable.12
The second coalition alone increases the average abatement levels by 18% and the average profit by
3.4% compared to the fully noncooperative structure. So, there are 11 regions out of 16 (approximately
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two-thirds of the countries) that can cooperate, and they improve the abatement level by around four
times and profit by around two times in comparison to the fully noncooperative structure. This is an
interesting result, as well one of the few optimistic ones from noncooperative game theory. This result
is a consequence of using a complex stability concept such as farsighted stability. However, grand
coalitions can still perform far better than our two coalitions. The grand coalition can further enhance
the total profit by more than two times and the total abatement level by almost four times in comparison
to our two coalitions, and hence there is still much room for improvement that cannot be used due to
the selfishness of our players (countries).
We reinforce the conclusion that the cooperation of certain countries like the USA or China (all
countries of the first coalition) is crucial for a successful international environmental policy. This means
that it is not only essential that a large number of countries signs an IEA, but also that certain key
countries must do so. Surprisingly, the WEU is not a participant in any coalition, and this contradicts
reality. This may be because we are not considering any commitment to cooperate in our noncooperative
game theoretic approach13.
The preferred myopically stable coalitions are:
(USA, CHI, NAF), (ANZ, SAS), and (FSU, LAM)
There are more multiple myopically stable coalitions than farsightedly stable ones, but myopically sta-
ble coalitions have fewer coalition members. The preferred myopically stable coalitions improve the
environment and welfare in comparison to the fully noncooperative structure. However, the farsight-
edly stable coalitions generate better results in terms of welfare and abatement levels compared to the
myopically stable coalitions. Only the farsightedly stable coalition (USA, LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA)
improves the welfare and abatement by 20% and 79% in comparison to all three preferred myopically
stable coalitions together.
7 COMPARING MYOPIC AND FARSIGHTED STABILITY: A
CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION
This section discusses the differences between myopic and farsighted stability, and furthermore details
a description of the way from the single coalition myopically stable coalition (USA, CHI, NAF) to the
single coalition farsightedly stable coalition (USA, LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA).
The myopically stable coalitions can be divided into three groups. The coalitions of the first group
are subcoalitions of the farsightedly stable coalition (USA, LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA):
(USA, CHI, NAF), (CHI, NAF, SSA)
The coalitions of the second group have members like 𝐴𝑁𝑍 and 𝐽𝑃𝐾 , which rarely form profitable
coalition:
(CAN, JPK, LAM, SAS, SSA)
(CAN, JPK, EEU, CAM, LAM, NAF, SIS)
(ANZ, EEU), (ANZ, CAM)
(JPK, NAF, SSA)
The myopic coalitions of the third group are small:
(CAN, SAS), (ANZ, SAS), (ANZ, SIS), (FSU, LAM).
We claim that the myopic stability is based on two myopic features. One is clear, as it allows only a
single movement of a coalition member. The next feature is that it demands that there is no free-riding.
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F I G U R E 1 The comparison between the myopic and farsighted stability
If free-riding exists it means that the profits from the cooperation are also big. If there is no free-riding,
this indicates that the profits from the cooperation are small. We take the coalition (USA, CHI, NAF) (or
(CHI, NAF, SSA)) of the first group of the myopically stable coalitions. There is no free-riding initiative
as the coalition is internally myopically stable. This signifies that if a country leaves the coalition, it
decreases its profit. However, this implies that any subcoalition of two countries of our coalition does
not reduce emissions as much as that a coalition member can take advantage of it and free-ride (the
level of cooperation is low). Therefore, myopic coalition formation stops when free-riding appears. On
the contrary, the farsightedly stable coalition formation does not stop when free-riding appears, but
it stops when the profitability condition is not satisfied any further. Consequently, one can build the
following scheme for describing a way from a myopic coalition to a farsightedly stable coalition:
(USA,CHI) ⇒ (USA, CHI, NAF)𝑑𝑠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
𝑚𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
⇒ (USA, CHI, NAF,SSA)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
⇒ ⋯ ⇒ (USA, LAM, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA)𝑓𝑠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓 𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
However, this is better seen in Figure 1. Along the 𝑦-axis we have single country profits in billions
of dollars. Along the 𝑥-axis, there are some possible coalitions from a fully noncooperative structure
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to a myopically stable coalition (𝑈𝑆𝐴,𝐶𝐻𝐼,𝑁𝐴𝐹 ), and it ends with a farsightedly stable coalition
(𝑈𝑆𝐴,𝐶𝐻𝐼,𝑁𝐴𝐹 , 𝑆𝑆𝐴, 𝑆𝐸𝐴,𝐿𝐴𝑀). When:
𝑥 = 1, we have 𝐴𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑥 = 2, we have (USA, CHI)
𝑥 = 3, we have (USA, CHI, NAF) 𝑥 = 4, we have (USA, CHI, NAF, SSA)
𝑥 = 5, we have (USA, CHI, NAF, SSA, SEA) 𝑥 = 6, we have (USA, CHI, NAF, SSA,
SEA, LAM)
Every line represents the changes in profit of the respective country when different coalitions are
formed. At the beginning of the dotted line, the respective country is not a member of a coali-
tion. At the end of the dotted line, the respective country joins the coalition. Countries that join the
coalition increase their profit until the myopically stable coalition (USA, CHI, NAF) is formed. After
the coalition (USA, CHI, NAF) is formed, every country that joins it, decreases its profit. This indi-
cates that the free-riding initiative exists, as these coalitions (all coalitions that contain the coalition
(USA, CHI, NAF) as a subcoalition) are not internally myopically stable. After the farsightedly stable
coalition (USA, CHI, NAF, SSA, SEA, LAM) is formed, the profitability condition is not satisfied any
longer. This situation implies there is no larger farsightedly stable coalition as farsighted stability is a
function of profitability, which is difficult to satisfy for a single large coalition. We have already clarified
that the asymmetry of countries does not allow large profitable coalitions. This is a typical situation in
a myopic coalition formation, and implies that myopically stable coalitions are frequently subsets of
farsightedly stable coalitions. As single farsightedly stable coalitions are not very large (only around
40% of the countries), this implies that myopically stable coalitions are small (only around 20% of the
countries). This occurs because the internal myopic stability demands no free-riding, and no free-riding
indicates that the cooperation brings only small improvements in both welfare and environmental qual-
ity (this includes that the myopically stable coalitions are going to be small).
All the coalitions of second group cause a decrease in abatement level and a worsening of environ-
mental quality in comparison to fully noncooperative structure. That is why they are grouped together.
This takes place because they have as a coalition member JPK or ANZ, which can frequently (but not
always) causes an abatement level decrease, as they have negative marginal damage costs of carbon
dioxide emissions 𝛽 (or a negative marginal benefit from emissions reduction), see Table 1. We focus on
the coalition (CAN, JPK, EEU, CAM, LAM, NAF, SIS) (the discussion is similar to the other coalition
of this group (CAN, JPK, LAM, SAS, SSA)), which belongs to the second group. Another distinctive
feature of this coalition is that the cooperation is very “fragile,” which means that if a country leaves
the coalition then the coalition is not more profitable. This denotes that if a country leaves the coalition,
then the coalition does not exist anymore and this stops the free-riding and even more. Besides, the
above coalition increases the welfare very little. Then we claim that internal myopic stability causes
big myopic coalitions (like (CAN, JPK, EEU, CAM, LAM, NAF, SIS) or (CAN, JPK, LAM, SAS, SSA))
that have very “fragile” cooperation and bring little improvement in welfare, or we have myopic coali-
tions that are small (like (USA, CHI, NAF) and are subcoalitions of a farsightedly stable coalition).
Concerning myopic coalitions, we reinforce the conclusions of Barrett (1994) who uses only stylized
cost-benefit functions and symmetric countries; we show that his conclusions hold in the case of more
realistic cost-benefit functions and asymmetric countries too. One can see the myopically stable coali-
tions as “minimum” (in welfare, environment improvement, and frequently in coalition size), while the
farsightedly stable coalition as “maximum” that can be achieved by game theory without transfers.
In real-world coalitions formation (such as Kyoto protocol without transfers), it is more reasonable to
expect that the majority of the players (countries) are going to display less than a farsighted behavior
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but more than a myopic behavior. Consequently, we should predict the formation of coalitions that are
bigger than myopically stable, but smaller than farsightedly stable coalitions.
The coalitions of the third group have in common that they are small, and they improve the welfare
and environmental quality (in spite of that two of them have 𝐴𝑁𝑍 as a member, who has a negative
marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions 𝛽, see Table 1).
8 CONCLUSIONS
This paper extends the analysis of Chwe (1994) on the issue of how to find farsightedly stable coali-
tions, and concentrates on the comparison between farsighted and myopic stability. The FUND model
provides the cost-benefit functions of greenhouse gas emission abatement. The dynamic of the damage-
cost functions of the FUND model controls the results.
The myopic stability concept assumes that the players are myopic and considers only single-player
movements. The farsighted stability captures the farsightedness of the players. This implies that if
a country considers deviating, it realizes that a deviation may trigger further deviations, which can
worsen its initial position. All single farsightedly stable and myopically stable coalitions are found as
well as their improvements to welfare and environmental quality. There are a lot more farsightedly sta-
ble coalitions than myopically stable coalitions, so farsighted stability increases room for cooperation.
We refine further the stable coalitions (farsightedly stable or myopically stable) to the preferred
stable coalition. The preferred stable coalitions are more likely to be formed from a usual starting state
such as a fully noncooperative structure in comparison to other stable coalitions.
We argue that myopic stability is myopic in two senses. First, because it considers only single-
player movements. Second, because the internal myopic stability demands no free-riding. Nevertheless,
no free-riding means that improvements (in welfare and environmental quality) from cooperation are
small. Therefore, the internal myopic stability indirectly demands that the improvements from cooper-
ation are small.
The size of the largest single farsightedly stable coalition and myopically stable coalition is small.
The myopic stability argues that the free-riding makes it difficult to have large single stable coalitions.
On the contrary, the farsighted stability argues that due to the asymmetry, the profitability condition
is hard to satisfy for large single farsightedly stable coalitions. Moreover, the asymmetry of countries
makes profitability condition hard to be realized and avoids maintaining big farsightedly stable coali-
tions. In spite of single myopic coalitions being small (only three countries) they bring improvements
in comparison to fully noncooperative structure. However, farsightedly stable coalitions improve the
welfare and environmental quality in comparison to myopically stable coalitions. We show that the
myopically stable coalitions are often subcoalitions of farsightedly stable coalitions. Moreover, far-
sightedly stable coalitions can be frequently the largest stable coalitions that can be attained without
side payments. Furthermore, they always produce the biggest improvements in environmental quality
and welfare. In real-world coalitions formation (such as Kyoto protocol), it is more reasonable to expect
that the majority of the players (countries) are going to display less than a farsighted behavior but more
than a myopic behavior. Consequently, we should predict the formation of coalitions that are bigger
than myopically stable but smaller than farsightedly stable coalitions. All those conclusions are valid
under the assumption that transfers are not allowed.
Considering the multiple farsightedly stable coalitions leads to an optimistic result of game the-
ory. Almost 70% of regions (40% in case of multiple myopically stable coalitions) can cooperate and
improve significantly welfare and environmental quality. However, the multiple farsightedly stable
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coalitions clearly increase the welfare and abatement levels compared to the multiple myopically stable
coalitions.
It will be interesting to consider more detailed regions and a game-theoretic approach which con-
siders side payments.
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APPENDIX A: FUND MODEL
This paper uses Version 2.8 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution
(FUND). Version 2.8 of the FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and applied by Tol (1999a, b,
2001, 2002c), except for the impact module, which is described by Tol (2002a,b) and updated by Link
and Tol (2004). A further difference is that the current version of the model distinguishes 16 instead
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of 9 regions. Finally, the model considers emission reductions of methane and nitrous oxide as well as
carbon dioxide, as described by Tol (2006).
Essentially, the FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations. The
model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, namely, the United States of America (USA),
Canada (CAN), Western Europe (WEU), Japan and South Korea (JPK), Australia and New Zealand
(ANZ), Central and Eastern Europe (EEU), the former Soviet Union (FSU), the Middle East (MDE),
Central America (CAM), South America (LAM), South Asia (SAS), Southeast Asia (SEA), China
(CHI), North Africa (NAF), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Small Island States (SIS). The model
runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of one year. The primary reason for starting in 1950 is to ini-
tialize the climate change impact module. In the FUND, the impacts of climate change are assumed
to depend on the impact of the previous year, in this way reflecting the process of adjustment to cli-
mate change. Because the initial values to be used for the year 1950 cannot be approximated very well,
both physical and monetized impacts of climate change tend to be poorly represented in the first few
decades of the model runs. The period 1950–1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is
based on the IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes & Goldewijk, 1994). The period 1990–2000 is based
on observations of the World Resources Databases (W.R.I., 2000). The climate scenarios for the period
2010–2100 are based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a
and IS92f (Leggett, Pepper, & Swart, 1992). The 2000–2010 period is interpolated from the immediate
past, and the period 2100–2300 is extrapolated.
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, autonomous energy
efficiency improvements, as well as the rate of the decarbonization of energy use (autonomous car-
bon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change, methane, and
nitrous oxide. The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of climatic
change.14
APPENDIX B: FINDING A MULTIPLE FARSIGHTEDLY STABLE
COALITION STRUCTURE






𝑡 , 𝑙1) (with 𝑡 coalitions, and 𝑙1 single




algorithm presented in Table B1 can find it (and then coalition structure 𝑎2 has to be tested, if there is
another coalition structure 𝑎3, which dominates it). If there is no coalition structure, which dominates
our initial coalition structure 𝑎1 = (𝐶1, 𝐶2 …𝐶𝑡, 𝑙1), the algorithm will give the answer that our initial
coalition structure 𝑎1 cannot be dominated, and consequently, is farsightedly stable or belongs to a
cycle.
As already explained in Subsection 3.2 we check for the first and second interaction.
• One interaction happens between coalition and single players while number of coalition is fixed; in
this case, one can talk again for indirect internal, external, and subcoalition domination.
• One interaction occurs among coalitions as well as between coalitions and single players while
coalition number can possibly change (a coalition can form or dissolve). We should check if this
interaction results that coalition structure 𝑓2 dominates the initial coalition structure 𝑓1. During the
inspection of player exchange among coalitions as well as between coalitions and single players,
three essential (sub)interactions can happen, which are lengthy explained in Subsection 3.2.
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T A B L E B1 Algorithm for finding farsightedly stable (EFS) coalition structures when 𝑡 coalitions are formed, and
𝑙1 players are single
Take the coalition structure 𝑎1 = (𝐶1, 𝐶2 …𝐶𝑡, 𝑙1) where 𝑙1
is the number of single players, 𝐶𝑖 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2,… 𝑡} are coalitions, and m is the total number of the players.
Calculate 𝜋(1)..𝜋(5)..𝜋(𝑚) the profits of this coalition structure.
Inspect the first interaction: for 𝑖 = 1 ∶ 𝑡
Inspect if coalition 𝐶𝑖 is internally, externally, or subcoalitionally stable, or find the coalition 𝐶𝑙1 (where
𝐶𝑙1 ∩ 𝐶𝑖 ≠ ∅).
Note at the moment exchanging members among coalitions is not allowed and the number of coalitions is fixed.
endif; end
Inspect the second interaction:
Inspect if the exchange of members among 𝐶1, 𝐶2 …𝐶𝑡, as well as the formation or dissolving of coalitions can
find out
that the initial coalition structure 𝑎1 = (𝐶1, 𝐶2 …𝐶𝑡, 𝑙1)








which has to be inspected for first and second interaction (and can possibly be farsightedly stable).
If by inspecting the first and second interaction, we are not able to find a coalition structure
which indirectly or directly dominates the coalition structure 𝑎𝑟 (which is actually being tested)
the coalition structure 𝑎𝑟 is farsightedly stable or belong to a cycle.
The coalition structure, which are indirectly dominated are excluded from
being a candidate of farsightedly stable coalitions.
END
It is crucial to mention that the algorithm is computationally expensive. However, similar to model
of Zermelo (1913) for solving chess, we would like to stress that checking for an arbitrary farsightedly
stable coalition structure is computationally expensive but possible, and finite.
ENDNOTES
1 We consider only economic incentives that a region has to join a coalition for environmental protection. Other factors
like commitment to cooperation are not taken into account.
2 This paper is conceived as the second part of the paper Osmani and Tol (2009); given that, the intersections between
them are inevitable.
3 The algorithms how to find single farsightedly stable coalitions are introduced in Osmani and Tol (2009), so we are
not repeating them here.
4 Please note that subcoalition domination is always of indirect domination in nature; in any simple subcoalition dom-
ination there are always two steps; on the first step, some countries leave the coalition, and on the second one, some
countries are join it. External (or internal) domination can be of a direct nature too; for example, two countries join
the coalition (or leave it), and the coalition domination process ends.
5 In Page and Wooders (2009), the authors raise the question of existence of the indirect dominant stable core. As in our
case we have profitable coalitions, and per-member partition functions are concave, we do not need to worry about the
existence of indirect dominant core.
6 The algorithms of tables A.1 and A.2 in Osmani and Tol (2009) (see Appendix) fully describe the procedure of finding
single farsightedly stable coalitions. As mentioned before we do not find it necessary to repeat them here. One of the
reasons is to keep the length of the paper to a reasonable size.
7 All computational programs in Matlab can be provided on request.
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8 We have independently reached a similar definition to Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2010). But Herings et al.
(2010) also give existence proof of farsightedly stable sets, while we are concentrating on the question of how to find
farsightedly stable coalitions.
9 We also assume that in the case of direct domination players (which are not farsighted) do not free-ride. This is peculiar,
but it can be justified because the free-riding is going to reduce the ability of players to find out if a coalition structure
is directly dominated or not.
10 In open membership games, the definition of myopic stability demands only that a country that joins a coalition reduces
its profit (Barrett, 1994). It is more realistic (as an exclusive membership game in our case) to add the second part that
a previous member of the coalition reduces his profit.
11 The discussion in this section is more relevant for farsighted stability, but it can somehow be applied to myopic stability
too. We simply grant members of myopically stable coalitions the possibility of choosing between different myopically
stable coalitions (which is an ad hoc assumption).
12 We introduce an observation that considers the division of farsightedly stable coalition in two or more coalitions.
Observation 6.1. A farsighted stable coalition cannot be divided in two or more coalitions.
Proof. Suppose that a coalition with six countries is divided into two subcoalitions with three countries (without loss
of generality). Country members maximize their total profit in all coalitions. Suppose that maximum value found for
the large coalition is 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓1 and for two subcoalitions are 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑎 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑏 (it is clear that those maximum points are
reached for different values of abatement levels R). Note that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓1 is a unique maximum because the Hessian matrix
is negative definite, so we have a strict concave function. As a consequence 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓1 > 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑎 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑏, otherwise it
contradicts the fact that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓1 is unique. This implies that at least one country has reduced profit (when the coalition
is divided) so that the inducement process is not possible. Note that the proof is true also in case that many farsighted
stable coalition coexist. ■
13 On the contrary, in a cooperative approach WEU is a key player, but the cooperative attitude is beyond the scope of
our paper. The WEU is always a member of coalitions (CHI, FSU, and USA too) that bring the maximum welfare
improvement, although they are not stable.
14 This is a short summary of the FUND; for a detailed description, please read more the FUND webpage: http://www.
fund-model.org/home.
